Production and hedging in both forward and options markets are analyzed for forward-looking firms that maximize expected utility. In the presence of unbiased forward and options prices, it is shown that such firms will use options as hedging instruments. This result contrasts with the conclusions from studies that assume myopic behavior, and occurs because forward looking agents care about the effect of future output prices on profits from future production cycles. Simulations support the theoretical results and show how the introduction of an options market influences the optimal forward position. 
I

MUL TIPERIOD PRODUCTION WITH FORWARD AND OPTIONS MARKETS
Most of the literature on risk aversion and price uncertainty has incorporated Sandmo's implicit assumption that the firm is concerned with a single production cycle. This convention has been extended into the hedging literature (e.g., Holthausen; Feder, Just, and Schmitz; Anderson and Danthine 1980; Losq; Batlin; Benninga, Eldor, and Zilcha; Smith and Stulz; Paroush and Wolf; Kerkvliet and Moffett) . However, output price changes that occur in one period will change price expectations for subsequent production periods. In addition, for industries with at least one fixed input, output supply changes will cause changes in input prices and optimal input use for subsequent production cycles. Firms operating and hedging in this environment will presumably have noticed the effects of changes in this period's price on next period's profitability and adjusted their hedging behavior accordingly. This paper extends the number of production cycles to two and shows how optimal hedging depends on the perceived relationships between this period's output price and next period's input and output prices.! We focus on forward rather than futures markets to show that the main results do not depend on the existence of basis risk, and also to avoid the complexities that arise from the presence of basis risk. In addition, we extend the model to incorporate options and show a valid role for options as hedging instruments that has here-to-fore been lacking in the one-period hedging models (Lapan, Moschini and Hanson; Sakong, Hayes, and Hallam) . The analysis by Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson reveals that myopic firms with nonstochastic production will use options only if futures and/or options prices are biased. Sakong, Hayes, and Hallam showed that production uncertainty will lead myopic fmns to use options for hedging purposes. In this paper, we will show that options are used for hedging even if production is nonstochastic and prices are unbiased, as long as firms exhibit forward-looking behavior. !Anderson and Danthine (1983) , Hey, and Karp also analyzed dynamic hedging. Our model differs from that of Anderson and Danthine (1983) in that they considered hedging revisions within a single production cycle. It differs from that of Hey in that he assumed that prices were independently distributed and that agents had intertemporally additive utility functions. Karp's basic model is similar to that of Anderson and Danthine (1983) , with the addition of stochastic production. None of these references includes options.
The first section of this paper develops the optimal options and forward positions for a finn that will be in operation for two periods. It is shown that the hedging decision made at the beginning of the first period will incorporate the effect of the first period's price changes on both the first and second periods' profits. The second period effect is caused by the impact of the fust period price on expected input and output prices for the second period. One of the more interesting aspects of this second period effect is that the fust period price will almost always have a nonlinear relationship with the profits from the second production cycle. Because the payoff from forward contracts is linear in prices, it is therefore not possible to fully hedge with forward contracts against this nonlinear relationship. Options offer a more flexible way of hedging against this nonlinearity and consequently options are shown to have a hedging role. The derivation of the optimal options position is complex because options truncate the distribution of expected returns. This derivation is the subject of the second section. In the third section, we perform simulations to calculate the expected-utility-maximizing forward and options positions for individuals with constant absolute risk aversion. These optimal positions are shown to depend on the characteristics of the utility and the production functions, and on the expected correlation among the first period's output prices and the second period's input and forward prices. These simulations are performed for an individual who has access to both forward and options markets and to a forward market alone.
The Theoretical Model
Consider a decision maker characterized by a twice differentiable utility function of tenninal wealth U(Wy) such that U' > 0 and U" < 0. Tenninal wealth is defined as initial wealth at the current date plus the cash flows arising up to and including the terminal date:2 2To simplify the exposition. interest rates are omitted in (1.1). The omission does not affect in any meaningful way the main conclusions of the study, as long as interest rates are nonstochastic and there are no constraints regarding the amounts of money that can be borrowed or lent at the prevailing interest mte.
where W, denotes monetary wealth at the end of trading date t and c, is cash flow at time t.
The agent can produce output Q, from input I,_ 1 by means of the transformation function Q, = q(I,_ 1 ), where qO is such that q' > 0, q" < 0, q(O) = 0, and q'(O) --+ oo.3 The time subscripts indicate that it takes one production cycle (from t-1 to t) to transform input into output. Production is assumed to be nonstochastic to emphasize that the role of options as hedging instruments is not due to production uncertainty (Sakong, Hayes, and Hallam) .
It is also assumed that the agent has access to forward and options markets for the final good. Only forward and put markets are considered, however, because any combination of forward, put, and call contracts can be replicated by any two of these financial instruments. To see why this assertion is true, examine the upper panel of Figure 1 . This position diagram shows the payoff to an investor who has written a put (dashed line) and who has sold a forward contract (solid line). The addition of the two payoffs (i.e., the sum of the vertical distances from the horizontal axis) yields the net payoff shown in the lower panel of Figure 1 . This net position is identical to the payoff of a written call. In fact, any two of forward, put, and call contracts can be used to replicate the third. This allows us to ignore calls in the analysis that follows without precluding call-like solutions.
At date t, the individual sells X, forward contracts for delivery at t+ 1 at the forward price F,. At date t+ 1, the individual repurchases the X, forward contracts at the prevailing cash price Pt+l' The cash flow from these two operations in the forward market occurs at date t+ 1 and is equal to [(F,-Pt+l) X,] . Similarly, the agent at date t buys z, puts with strike price F, at a price Rt' and at t+ 1 obtains a revenue of zero if Pt+l exceeds the strike price F,, or a gain of [(F,-P,+ 1 ) Z,J otherwise. 4 Given this setting, the cash flow at each decision date is given by (1.2) c, = P, Q, + (F,_ 1 -P,) X,_ 1 -R, z, + (F,_ 1 -P,) L, z,_ 1 -H, I, 3These conditions on qO are standard assumptions in production models. These conditions are useful because in most scenarios they rule out the possibility of negative input demand.
4Note that x, < 0 (Z, < 0) means that the agent is buying forward (selling put) contracts at date t. J where H, denotes input price, and L, is a binary variable such that L, = 1 when the put option finishes in the money (F,_ 1 > P,) and L, = 0 when the put option finishes at or out of the money (F,_ 1 ~ P,).
Because our purpose is to explore the consequences of relaxing the assumption of a single production cycle, and because a two-production cycle model captures the essentials, we limit the discussion to the two-cycle case. Denote the current decision date by t = 1, the next decision date by t = 2, and the terminal date (T) by t = 3. The optimal decisions regarding input, and forward and put positions at the current date t = 1 (i.e., I 1 , X 1 , and Z 1 ) must solve the following set of recursive equations:
where: p, = (P,, H,, F,, R,), J2., = CPa····· p,).
E,(·) denotes the expectation operator based on information available at t, the matrix Jl, comprises the cash, forward, and put prices up to (and including) time t, and cash flows are given by (1.2).
Equations (1.3) through (1.5) tell us that the decision maker at the current decision date chooses the levels of input, puts, and forward contracts that maximize expected utility over the entire planning horizon, assuming that the future levels of input, forward contracts, and puts will be chosen so as to maximize expected utility over the rest of the planning horizon.
The optimizing levels of forward contracts and puts at the current date are obtained by starting at the terminal date and working backwards. Simple inspection of (1.3) indicates that the value of I 3 that maximizes UO is zero (I 3 * = 0) because UO is a strictly decreasing function of I 3 and I 3 cannot be negative. Substituting I 3 * = 0 into the expression for terminal wealth yields
At date 2, the optimum levels of input (I 2 *), puts (Zz *), and forward contracts (X 2 *) must satisfy the following necessary first order conditions (FOCs)
( 1.7) (1.8)
where M 3 ' denotes U' evaluated at I 3 *, I 2 *, Zz*, and X 2 *. Combining (1.7) and (1.8), we get
, which means that the optimal level of input (and therefore of production) is determined separately from the optimal number of puts and forward contracts. The optimal input demand at date 2 is a function of the ratio of input and forward prices only, i.e., I 2 * = q'-l(Hjf 2 ),
where q'-1 is the inverse function of q'5
It can be inferred that the decision problem at date 2 represents the standard myopic or static decision problem. Only one production cycle remains at date 2; therefore, the decision maker behaves as if he or she were to stop producing at the end of the current cycle. This myopic model has been extensively used in studying optimal production and hedging behavior; in particular, the case of production in the presence of futures and options has been recently analyzed by Lapan, 5 The inverse function q'-1 exists because q" < 0 by assumption.
Moschini, and Hanson. Perhaps the most important (and striking) result obtained by these authors is that options are not used as hedging instruments if both forward and options prices are unbiased {i.e., EiP 3 ) = F 2 and E 2 [(
Under unbiasedness, the optimal decisions are given by I 2 * = q'· 1 (Hz1F 2 ), Z 2 * = 0, and X 2 * = Q 3 • [ = q(I 2 *)], independently of the degree of risk aversion and the initial wealth.
One of the purposes of this study is to show that, in contrast with the myopic case, options are generally useful hedging instruments for forward-looking decision makers even if both forward and options prices are unbiased. The optimal amount of puts bought by a myopic decision maker is generally nonzero when prices are biased; hence, to demonstrate that our results are driven by forward-looking behavior rather than biased prices we will assume throughout that prices are unbiased {i.e., E,(P,+ 1 ) = F, and E,[(F,-P,+ 1 ) L,+ 1 ] = R,).6 Then, substituting I 1 *, I/. Z/. and X 2 * under unbiased forward and options prices in the expression for terminal wealth (1.1) we get
The term n represents the profits arising from optimal behavior in the second production cycle; n is nonnegative because it is zero if I 2 • = 0 and strictly positive if I 2
Finally, the necessary FOCs for optimality at the current date t = 1 are 6We assume that markets are unbiased throughout the paper because we are interested in hedging behavior. Any changes from the optimal positions caused by the introduction of biased markets would be speculative by definition. Therefore. we learn nothing about hedging behavior by introducing biased markets.
( 1.13) where M 2 ' denotes U' evaluated at I 3 *, I 2 *, Z 2 *, X 2 *, I 1 *, Z 1 *, and X 1 *. As it was the case for the myopic scenario (t = 2), the optimal input level for the forward-looking finn is detennined separately from the optimal levels of puts and forward contracts. Optimal input demand at date 1 is given by I 1 * = q'-l(H/F 1 ).
To characterize the optimal forward and put positions, it is helpful to express FOCs (1.12) and (1.13) as (1.12') and (1.13'), respectively:?
where Cov 1 (·) denotes the covariance operator, given information at date t. Evaluate now Cov 1 (P 2 , M 3 ') and Cov 1 [(F 1 -P 2 ) L 2 , M 3 '] at the levels that would be optimal if the firm were myopic, that is, selling forward the entire output {X 1 = Q 2 * [ = q(I 1 *)]} and buying zero puts (Z 1 = 0). Plugging these values in (1.10) yields W 3 = W 0 + c 1 + F 1 Q 2 * + n. This means that, in general, X 1 = Q 2 * [ = q(I 1 *)] and Z 1 = 0 are the optimal forward and put positions only if IT and P 2 are independently distributed. If IT and P 2 are not independent, setting X 1 = Q 2 • and Z 1 = 0 generally will not render M 3 ' and P 2 independent, and consequently Cov 1 (P 2 , M 3 ') "¢' 0 and
Hence, X 1 = Q 2 * and Z 1 = 0 are not optimal because the necessary FOCs (1.12') and (1.13') do not hold for such values ofX 1 and Z 1 . The myopic case, which is the assumption upon which much of the literature is based, can be obtained by setting IT= 0 and can therefore be viewed as a special case of the model presented here. The direction and magnitude to which X 1 * differs from Q 2 • and Z 1 * differs from zero in the more realistic scenario where IT and P 2 are not independent is the focus of the following sections.
The Role of Options as Hedging Instruments for Forward-Looking Producers
Inspection of n =o F 2 q(I/) · H 2 I 2 • reveals that the only way for nand Pz to be independent is the very unrealistic instance in which both F 2 and Hz are independently distributed from P 2 . Thus, the key is whether at time one the agent believes that output price is related to input or forward prices at date two. Any price shock that is not viewed as transitory will change expected cash and forward prices at subsequent periods. Input prices at date twill respond to changes in output prices at date t-1 if input supply is other than perfectly elastic and if output prices at date t-1 alter optimal production at date t for at least a subset of producers. Producers who belong to this subset may, for example, bid up input prices because they view an output price increase as permanent or because higher output prices create more liquidity and allow them to expand production. For our purposes, it does not matter whether this input price response is caused by rational behavior, but only that the decision maker believes it may occur.
Assume that Fz and Hz are each a differentiable function of P 2 and of other random variable independent of P z• i.e.,
where f and h are random variables with finite variances. The random variables f and h are possibly related to each other but they are independent of P 2 . Let g(P z) be the expectation of M 2 ' over f and h, i.e., g(P 2 ) =o E 1 (M 2 '1P 2 ), where the notation g(P 2 ) emphasizes that P 2 is the only random variable affecting the function g(·). Then, FOCs (1.12) and (1.13) can be rewritten as This Proposition is important because it reveals that key results previously reported regarding optimal hedging behavior (i.e., optimality of a null position in options coupled with forward full hedging under unbiased prices) are due to the assumption of myopic behavior.
Moreover, whether decision makers are forward-looking or myopic can be (at least conceptually) tested empirically because their behavioral differences are observable.
The reason for resorting to a nonstandard technique (i.e., the Mean-Value Theorem) to prove the above Proposition is as follows. If n and P 2 were independently distributed, the optimal forward and put positions would be X 1 * =.Q 2 * and Z/ = 0, and the graph of g(P 2 ) would look like the horizontal line in Figure 2 . In contrast, when nand P 2 are not independent the optimal forward and put positions are X 1 * ;e Q 2 * and Z 1 * ;e 0 (see Proposition), and the graph of g(P 2 ) looks something like the dashed line in Figure 2 . If n and P 2 are not independent, the function g(P 2 ) is differentiable everywhere except where P 2 equals the strike price F 1 . Moreover, the function g(P 2 ) need not be concave or convex on either side of F 1 for the Proposition to hold.
As we already discussed, whether the optimal combination of forward and put contracts is (X 1 * = Q2 *, Z 1 * = 0) or (X 1 * ;e Q 2 *, Z 1 * ;e 0) depends on whether n and P 2 are independently Figure 2 . Graph of the function g(P 2 ).
gi = g(P 2 ) when 0 and P 2 are independent. ,. 
ilPz
The second derivative ()2I1J()p / is nonnegative because q" < 0 by assumption. This assumption means that there are decreasing returns to scale, which is the most realistic scenario because fmns under perfect competition will only produce at a point at which q" < 0. The linear relationship between output prices and payoff in the myopic model exists because production levels and costs are predetennined. When we introduce a second relevant production cycle, the convexity of the profit function re-emerges. Figure 3 depicts the range of possible impacts of next period output price (P 2 ) on the profits from the next production cycle (0), assuming that ()2I1JilPl is strictly positive. Figure 3 also shows schematically how options and forward contracts can be used to hedge the additional risk attributable to the next production cycle. It can be seen that n is nonnegative and that the relationship between nand P 2 is nonlinear. Options allow producers to create hedged positions 8Note that F 2 q'(l;l ~ H, from the FOCs corresponding to date t ~ 2 [see discussion following FOCs (1.7) through (1.9)].
9The expression for ai;;aP 2 can be obtained by differentiating F 2 q'(l 2 with kinked payoffs. This kink allows producers to better hedge the additional risk than the linear forward position. It is clear from Figure 3 that to hedge the additional risk attributable to the next production cycle, the agent will sell puts if ClfVCJP 2 < 0, and sell puts and forward contracts (which is equivalent to selling calls) if ClfVCJP z > 0. It is also clear that if options are not available, the forward-looking flrm will sell forward more (less) than its entire production if ClfVCJPz < (>) 0.
In order to flnd the relative size of the optimal forward and put positions, it is necessary to specify the utility function (U), the production function (q), and the relationships between Pz and Fz and Hz [i.e., Fz = F(P 2 , f) and H 2 = H(P 2 , h)]. The next section presents simulated examples that show how the optimal forward and put positions respond to some of the parameters characterizing U, q, F 2 = F(P 2 , f), and Hz= H(P 2 , h).
Numerical Simulations
In this section, we present and discuss the results of numerical simulations regarding the theoretical Proposition derived previously. Although these simulations correspond to particular scenarios, they are helpful in assessing the orders of magnitude of the forward and options positions involved.
The simulations are performed assuming that the decision maker is constant absolute risk averse (CARA), i.e., 
where the symbol represents variables measured at the means (P 2 = f1, f = 0, h = 0), and the subscripts along with I1 denote the derivatives of I1 with respect to the respective random variables.
The optimal forward and put positions can be calculated after (i) substituting expression (3.4) into (1.10) and the resulting expression into the utility function (3.1), (ii) calculating the expected utility over the random variables P 2 , f, and h, and (iii) finding the combination of decision variables that maximizes the expected utility. At stage (ii), the combined assumption of CARA utility and normally distributed random variables coupled with the second-order Taylor expansion (3.4) proves very helpful because it allows a substantial simplification of the calculations. Under these conditions, two out of the three integrals comprised in the expression for expected utility have closed-form solutions, thus greatly simplifying the numerical integration.lO
The simulation exercise can be performed for any decision setting for which the theoretical model provides a reasonable approximation. Because of data availability, the particular example chosen is the production of fat cattle (Q 1 + 1 ) from feeder cattle (I 1 ). The decision maker is assumed A A to be a representative producer, for whom Q 3 = 120,000 pounds of fat beef and I 2 = 60,000
A A pounds of feeder cattle, where Q 3 and I 2 equal production and input demand evaluated at the means lODetails about the simulations are available from the authors upon request.
of the random variables. The output elasticity of factor demand (11Qr) is assumed to equal 0.9, and the transformation of feeder cattle to fat cattle is hypothesized to last 8 months. Based on price data over the period [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] 11 it is postulated that F 1 = ~ = F 2 = 70, crp2 = crF2 = 70, and crH2 = 250, where prices are expressed in dollars of December 1986 per 100 pounds, and crF 2 and crH2 denote the variances of F 2 and H 2 , given information at date t = 1.
Sensitivity analysis was performed for the degree of absolute risk aversion (A.), the elasticity of input demand with respect to forward price (TliF), the derivative of input prices with respect to output cash prices (1\t), 12 and the relationship between forward and output cash prices (~F). 13 When ~F = 0, the underlying hypothesis is that output cash price shocks are transitory,
i.e., price shocks at a particular date have no effect on prices at later dates. In contrast, ~F = 1 represents the case in which price shocks at a particular date are permanent because they affect prices forever. Note that different values of 1\t and~ imply different values of crh2 and cr?
because crh 2 = crH2-~H2 crp2 and cr/ = crF2-~F2 crp2·
The results of the simulations are presented in Table 1 . The optimal levels of the decision variables are expressed in thousands of pounds. Optimal production (Qz') equals 120,000 pounds in all instances. Therefore, for a myopic decision maker it would be optimal to sell forward 120,000 pounds and to have a zero put position. In contrast, a forward-looking agent will find it optimal to sell the number of forward contracts reported in the column labeled (X 1 *1 Z 1 = Z 1 *) and to buy the amount of puts indicated in the column labeled (Z 1 *). The amount of puts bought is negative in all instances, which means that the optimal strategy in this example is to sell puts.
llCash prices used were monthly averages of daily prices corresponding to medium frame one steer calves at Kansas City and 900-i,HlO pounds choice slaughter steers at Omaha, reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Prices were expressed in real terms by using the Producer Price Index.
1 2 Empirical estimates of ~H for different months ranged from 1.05 to 1.40 without correcting for autocorrelation, and from 0.93 to 1.30 when the correction was imposed. 13 Using futures as proxies for forward prices, we obtained sample estimates of ~F ranging between 0.82 and 1.07 depending on the month being considered. Futures prices were monthly averages of daily futures prices for live cattle at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, reported in the Statistical Yearbook of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The October contract was used in January and February, the December contract in March and April, the February contract in May and June. the April contract in July and August, the June contract in September and October, and the August contract in November and December. Because one can create any desired forward/options payoff with any two contracts of the set of forward, put, and call contracts, we restricted the choice to forward and put contracts. But this restriction does not prevent the decision maker from creating a written call position. To do so, the producer sells forward more than 120,000 pounds and sells puts. The forward contracts in excess of 120,000 pounds coupled with the written puts create a written call position that hedges against 11 when ()f]j()P 2 is positive everywhere (see Figure 3c ). This situation occurs when l3p = 1, i.e., when the producer perceives price shocks as permanent.
From Table 1 , it can also be seen that In the simulations reponed, the amount of puts bought is positively related to the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (A) and negatively related to the elasticity of input demand with respect to forward prices (TJIF) . Although in unreported simulations both relationships also held for all other values of the exogenous variables that were tried, we were unable to prove that they always hold.
The relationship between Z 1 * and TJIF should be negative in most situations because increasing llJF increases the convexity of 11 as a function of P 2 :14
The effect of TliF on the convexity of IT is attributable to the fact that IT depends essentially on input usage at date 2, and the absolute changes in input usage due to P 2 are larger the larger is the elasticity 'llJF· Expression (3.5) helps explain the negative (positive) relationship between ~Hand the amount of puts bought when l3r: = 0 (~F = 1). When ~F = 0, the convexity of IT is positively related to the absolute magnitude of~ (1~1). Intuitively, ~Hi' 0 means that the agent perceives future input cash prices (H 2 ) to be associated with future output cash prices (P 2 ). But future profits (IT) are a convex function of Hz because of the response of future input use (l:z) to Hz.
Hence, the larger I~HI, the larger the convexity of IT as a function of P z· For similar reasons, the convexity of IT is positively related to the absolute magnitude of ~P given ~H = 0.
When ~Hand l3r: have the same signs, the effect that P 2 exerts on th~ curvature of IT through Hz tends to offset the effect of Pz on the curvature of IT through F 2 . If~ is positive, the producer will tend to reduce I 2 (and therefore Q 3 ) as P 2 increases. But if ~F is also positive, the agent will tend to increase Q 3 (and therefore I 2 ) with increases in P 2 . These two responses of I 2 to P 2 work in opposite directions, tending to cancel with each other. The maximum offsetting effect occurs when ~H = ~F 11Qr Qytl 2 , at which fiPP = 0 [see (3.5)]. At this value of ~H· IT is approximately a linear function of P 2 , thus rendering puts unnecessary. This observation makes sense, there must be a set of circumstances under which the advantages of forward price increases are exactly offset by increases in input costs. In Table 1 , the closest scenario to flpp = 0 is when ~H = 1.5 and ~F = 1, at which the optimal amounts of puts bought are near zero (Z/ ranges between -2.3 and -0.8).
Unreported simulations reveal that the optimal amount of puts purchased is negatively related to crp2, and positively related to crF2 and cri. The negative effect in the quantity of puts bought caused by an increase in crl outweighs the positive effect due to the same percentage increase in crF2 and crH2 Within reasonable bounds, however, the optimal put position does not seem very sensitive to changes in the magnitudes of the variances.
absence of puts, and the column labeled (X 1 *1 Z 1 = Z 1 *) reports the optimal forward positions in the presence of puts. These two columns reveal that the amount of forward contracts sold when puts are available is greater than the amount sold when puts are not available. The explanation of this result is that forward contracts are used for two purposes: (i) offsetting the convexity of n, and
(ii) offsetting the average slope of n. To offset the convexity of n, it is necessary to sell both forward and put contracts; but because forward contracts alone are not useful for this purpose, the absence of options leads to a net loss in the number of forward contracts sold. In contrast, to offset the average slope of n, forward contracts alone are used; therefore, the amount of forward contracts employed for this purpose is unaffected by the availability of options. The use of forward contracts to offset the average slope of n explains why the amount of forward contracts sold is positively associated with ~(given a particular value of 1\J), and negatively related to ~H (given a particular value of ~F). From expression (2.5), it can be seen that Clf1/CJP 2 (and therefore the average slope of m increases with ~p for a given ~H·
The increase in the amount of forward contracts sold attributable to the availability of puts suggests a synergetic effect between the two types of contracts from a hedger's perspective. In other words, the scenario analyzed depicts a situation in which puts complement rather than compete with forward contracts. The opposite is true if the options available are calls rather than puts. That is, in the absence of puts, the decision maker will sell less forward contracts if calls can be traded than if calls cannot be traded. Hence, the example is such that calls compete with forward contracts. The reason for this result is that the payoff of any position involving the sale of x forward contracts andy puts can be replicated by a combination of selling (x-y) forward contracts and selling y calls. For example, if calls were available but puts were not, the simulation in the first row of Table 1 would involve selling calls for 2,000 pounds and forward contracts for 91,000 (= 93,000-2,000) pounds. It can be seen that the amount of forward contracts sold in the presence of calls and the absence of puts (91,000 pounds) is less than that sold in the absence of options (92,000 pounds).
In this example, the producer always sells puts because the simulations assumed decreasing returns to scale. Had it been assumed increasing returns to scale, puts would always be purchased [see (2.6')]. Decreasing returns to scale is a more realistic assumption, yet the optimality of writing puts seems counterintuitive. This result occurs because the producer uses the forward market to reduce price risk on the long physical position. Were we to make the forward market redundant (instead of the call market), the producer would achieve the exposure depicted in the sixth column of Table I by purchasing puts and writing calls to create a synthetic forward position.
Concluding Remarks
In a standard one-period (or myopic) model under nonstochastic production and unbiased forward and options prices, it is optimal to sell the entire production in the forward market for output and to hold a null position in options. Relaxing the restrictive assumption of a single production cycle (i.e., allowing for forward-looking behavior), however, will generally change the optimal forward position and create a hedging role for options. The reason for the behavioral difference between myopic and forward-looking agents is that the latter realize that this period's (random) output prices will be associated in a nonlinear manner with prices in subsequent periods.
The function g(P 2 ) is continuous and differentiable everywhere except at P 2 = F 1 , at which it is continuous but not Because pis a one-to-one mapping of P 2 , the first derivative of g(P 2 ) with respect to P 2 evaluated at P 2 = p equals where rnz" = M 2 "(P 2 = p) and rr' = Clll!CJP 2 evaluated at P 2 = p. But from (Al) through (A3) we also have (A 7'') can be combined to yield the following expressions forthe optimal forward and put positions: It must be true that £pp < £PPL < 0 because~" < 0 (from the assumption that U" < 0) and (F 1 -P 2 )2 > 0 for P 2 >' F 1 . For the same reasons, £PPrt < £PP7tL < 0 if 1t' > 0 everywhere, and £PP1t > £PPrtL > 0 if 1t' < 0 everywhere. If 1t' is not either positive or negative everywhere, then the signs and relative magnitudes of £PP7t and £PP7tL are ambiguous. Finally, the sign of£,.. is ambiguous in general, but it is strictly positive in the most realistic case of decreasing absolute risk aversion. Hence, barring pathological cases, it will be true that X 1 * >' Q 2 * and Z 1 * * 0. Q.E.D.
